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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage
of Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section
the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract de-
scription; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied war-
ranties may arise from courses of dealing or usage of trade.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
tScANLmq V. FOOD CRAFTS, INC.
2 Conn. Cir. 3, 193 A.2d 610 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-315, infra.
SECTION 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
ANNOTATION
$SCANLON V. FOOD CRAFTS, INC.
2 Conn. Cir. 3, 193 A.2d 610 (1963)
Plaintiff purchased a grinder (a type of sandwich) from defendant's
cart vendor. Defendant bought all ingredients for the sandwiches including
the bread from suppliers, but made the grinders itself. The bread ordinarily
used by the defendant was hard outside and soft inside. When the plaintiff
t Based on 1962 Code.
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took his first bite, he felt a sharp pain and found that a de-sensitized tooth
had broken on the bread which was stale and hard throughout. Plaintiff
brought an action for damages arising from defendant's alleged breach of
implied warranty.
The court held that the seller was liable for damages resulting from
the natural consequences of his breaching the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose as imposed by Section 2-315. Hence, the defendant's
defense that the injury was caused by the plaintiff's weak tooth would not
prevail since the injury was a consequence of the breach.
COMMENT'
Although the result would not differ, this case should have been de-
cided under Section 2-314 rather than 2-315. The facts clearly point to an
implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for the ordinary purposes
for which the goods are used within the meaning of Section 2-314(2)(c)
rather than a particular purpose. The buyer intended to use the grinder in
the same manner in which every other grinder is used—to eat it. He had
no particular purpose as required by Section 2-315.
The court mentioned that no defense was raised to exclude the im-
plied warranty under Section 2-316(3) (b). Under the facts of the instant
case, it seems doubtful that the defense, if raised, would have changed the
result. A buyer in these circumstances would not reasonably be required
to open the sandwich and examine the inside before eating.
Although the court did not cite Section 2-715(2) (b) specifically, the
measure of damages used seems properly within it. However, it might be
argued that all the damages which occurred were not the proximate result
of the breach, but that the plaintiff's weak tooth was the cause of at least
part of the damages for which the defendant would not be liable.
R.B.S.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*Pacunowsia V. MINNESOTA MINING & MFG.
80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-318, infra.
SECTION 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be con-
strued wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject
to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section
2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such
construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to
exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties
of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warran-
ties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults"
or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he de-
sired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied
warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought
in the circumstances to hove revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with
the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and
on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*SCANLON V. FOOD CRAFTS, INC.
2 Conn. Cir. 3, 193 A.2d 610 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-315, supra.
SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express
or Implied
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of
the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
ANNOTATION
*tCONNOLLY V. HAC1
24 Conn. Super. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963)
Plaintiff, a gasoline station employee, was injured while repairing the
back-up lights of an automobile manufactured by Chrysler Corp. The in-
jury occurred when the owner pushed the reverse button of the automatic
transmission while the motor was running, causing the automobile to lurch
backward and pin plaintiff underneath. The plaintiff brought an action al-
leging negligence against the owner and Chrysler and breach of express and
implied warranty against Chrysler.
The court, in overruling Chrysler's demurrer to the warranty count,
Based on 1962 Code.
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action in implied warranty
even in the absence of contractual privity. Basing its decision on the fact
of the manufacturer's massive advertising upon which the plaintiff had re-
lied as well as the trend of decisions in Connecticut and other states ex-
tending the coverage of warranty, the court stated as a matter of public
policy the broad rule that "the warranty should be extended to all those
who could reasonably be anticipated to use, occupy or service the operation
of the chattel." In citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), to support that proposition, the court approved
the discussion of Section 2-318 and the Official Comment, adding that it
would be unrealistic to protect the wife of the purchaser of an automobile,
as in Henningsen, but not the mechanic who services it.
COMMENT
The rule set forth in this case is the broadest and most liberal extension
of implied warranty. The court did not draw the line at the family or guests
of the purchaser as had previous cases, but rather it extended the coverage
to include those who "use, occupy or service" the goods of the manufacturer.
This rule, however, is not broad enough to include the person who, for ex-
ample, standing by the roadside, is struck and injured by a defectively
manufactured automobile.
A theory that would include members of the general public has been
proposed. However, absolute liability to any person has not been imposed
by any court; that the person harmed had some connection with the pur-
chaser or with the goods prior to the injury is required.
Another theory which would have the implied warranty run with the
goods similar to warranties which run with the land in real property law
would be more restrictive than the rule set out by the court in the instant
case, and a mechanic who has no interest in the automobile to which such
warranty could attach would not be protected.
Although this case was not decided under the Code, the court mentioned
Section 2-318 in reaching its result. The Official Comment to that section
points out the Code's neutrality toward case law extensions of warranties
to persons in the distributive chain. It seems implicit in the Official Com-
ment that warranty cannot be extended beyond this chain. Thus, the by-
stander might not recover if the Comment to Section 2-318 were applied
strictly. The court's indication at one point that "distributive chain" in-
cluded the plaintiff who became a "consumer" when the owner requested
him to service the automobile is somewhat far-fetched. It may help to justify
the holding, but it is clear that the court was intent on finding for the plain-
tiff as a matter of public policy.
R.B.S.
ANNOTATION
• jAKIJBOWSKI V. MINNESOTA MINING & MFG.
80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963)
• Code construed but did not govern the case.
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Ford Motor Co. purchased abrasive discs from the defendant manu-
facturer to be used for edge sanding operations. Ford and its employees
relied on statements in the defendant's price list and catalogue which de-
scribed the discs as "stronger, sharper, and longer lived," and as being the
"best all-purpose disc—for edge sanding" and listed them as "3M Discs
Type 'C'—Green Back." Ford also conducted random tests on the discs to
determine their applicability to the particular intended operation and the
quality of each lot of discs purchased. They found that one disc would
last for five operations.
The plaintiff, an employee of Ford, was injured when a disc which he
was using in grinding broke apart and hit him in the abdomen. He brought
an action against the manufacturer based on negligence and breach of ex-
press and implied warranty. The manufacturer raised, inter alia, the de-
fenses of absence of express warranty, lack of contractual privity and ex-
clusion of warranty by reasonable inspection. The lower court entered an
involuntary dismissal against the plaintiff on both counts.
On appeal, although the court affirmed the lower court's ruling on the
negligence count, it reversed the dismissal of the finding on the alleged
breach of warranty, holding that the question should have been presented
to the jury. Even though the court applied the New Jersey Uniform Sales
Act, it cited the sections of the Code which would have applied had it been
in effect, indicating that the new law would not change the result. While
rejecting the claimed breach of express warranty because the information
in the defendant's catalogue was only an expression of opinion, the court,
however, did find ample evidence to support an implied warranty. In re-
solving the lack of privity issue, the court cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), for the proposition that
members of the purchaser's family could recover on an implied warranty
against the seller. It then found the plaintiff to be a part of the Ford
"family" because of his employment. It then stated the broad rule set
forth in Henningsen to the effect that warranties should be extended to all
users of the goods who could reasonably be anticipated. The plaintiff was
also found to be in this class. Thus, plaintiff was not barred by privity from
stating a cause of action.
The court rejected the defendant's claim of an exclusion of implied
warranty by reason of an inspection which reasonably should have revealed
the defects because the tests necessary to discover such defects would have
destroyed the usefulness of the discs. The defense that the discs were sold
under a trade name which, under the Uniform Sales Act, would exclude any
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was not accepted since
the court determined the catalogue designation to be for the convenience
of the defendant and not a trade name.
COMMENT
It is not clear what the precise basis for the decision was in this case.
The court first states the policy rule of the Henningsen case, but then,
probably to give the decision stronger support as precedent, distorts the
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meaning of "family" so as to include this plaintiff employee. It would have
been more proper to decide the case on the basis of the broad rule alone,
as a matter of public policy and thereby define the limits of Section 2-318.
The instant case is contrary to the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
case of Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963),
annotated in 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 612 (1963). In Hochgertel, the
court refused to allow an employee of the purchaser to recover on an im-
plied warranty, despite developing case law in the lower state and federal
courts of Pennsylvania which would support allowing recovery. There is
no logical distinction between the facts of the instant case and those of
Hochgertel.
The defense available under the Sales Act that the discs were sold
under a trade name which eliminated an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose has been eliminated from the provisions of the Code as
a defense per se. Section 2-315. Cf. Official Comment 11.
R.B.S.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*WILSON V. AMERICAN CHAIN & CABLE, INC.
216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
For a complete discussion and analysis of this case, see note infra
p.—. Also see Annotation, supra p. 155.
SECTION 2-609. Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired.
When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the per-
formance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate
assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may
if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not
already received the agreed return.
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity
and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined accord-
ing to commercial standards.
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prej-
udice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future
performance.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a
reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due per-
formance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is
a repudiation of the contract.
ANNOTATION
•REPUBLIC -ODIN APPLIANCE CORP. V. CONSUMERS PLUMBING & HEATING
SUPPLY, INC.
192 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1963)
Based on 1962 Code.
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
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In November 1958, the defendant-buyer had several orders pending
with the plaintiff-seller to be delivered in installments. A dispute arose as
to the validity of the buyer's arbitrarily withholding a portion of the pay-
ment for the first shipment as insurance for future deliveries. The seller had
informed the buyer that its action was unwarranted and it, therefore, re-
fused to ship future orders; the buyer responded that it was going to pur-
chase the goods elsewhere unless certain unprecedented demands were met.
In an action by the seller for the amount withheld to which the buyer had
counterclaimed for the difference in price it had paid for the goods, the
court entered judgment for the seller. It held that the holding back of a
portion of the shipment price constituted a material breach which, under
the Uniform Sales Act, permitted the seller to repudiate the future orders.
The court noted the right of a party to an installment contract to receive
assurance that future performance will be forthcoming as provided by the
not then effective UCC. It cites Section 2-609, as providing a manner of
obtaining adequate assurance.
COMMENT
Had the Code governed this case, it is doubtful whether it would
have been decided under Section 2-609. While it does appear from the facts
that the seller might have had reasonable grounds for insecurity, it is not
clear as to whether the seller, effectively in writing, demanded adequate
assurances from the buyer that performance would be forthcoming when due.
The seller's letter was an affirmative notification of discontinuance of per-
formance by the seller with respect to all future orders and not a demand
for assurance of future performance of the buyer. Since such a demand
was not made, Section 2-609 would not justify the seller's treating the
buyer's failure to make the complete payment as a repudiation.
The seller's course of action might have been justifiable under Sec-
tion 2-610 or 2-612. Under Section 2-612, if the breach of the first order
was one which substantially impaired the value of the whole contract,
rather than the first installment, all future installments under the contract
were breached. Upon such a breach the seller could treat the future in-
stallments as being anticipatorily repudiated, as provided by Section 2-610.
C.K.B.
SECTION 2-610. Anticipatory Repudiation
When either party repudiates the contract with respect to a per-
formance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value
of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may
(a) for a commercially reasonable time await performance by the
repudiating party; or
(b) resort to any remedy for breach (Section 2-703 or Section
2-711), even though he has notified the repudiating party that
he would await the latter's performance and has urged retrac-
tion; and
(c) in either case suspend his own performance or proceed in ac-
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cordance with the provisions of this Article on the seller's right
to identify goods to the contract notwithstanding breach or to
salvage unfinished goods (Section 2-704).
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*REPUBLIC-ODIN APPLIANCE CORP. V. CONSUMERS PLUMBING & HEATING
SUPPLY, INC.
192 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-609, supra.
SECTION 2-612. "Installment Contract"; Breach
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes the
delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though
the contract contains a clause "each delivery is a separate contract" or
its equivalent.
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming if
the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and
cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required docu-
ments; but if the non-conformity does not fall within subsection (3) and
the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that
installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more
installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is
a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract
if he accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably notifying of
cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to past installments
or demands performance as to future installments.
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
*REPUBLIC-ODIN APPLIANCE CORP. V. CONSUMERS PLUMBING & HEATING
SUPPLY, INC.
192 N.E.2d 132 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-609, supra.
SECTION 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise;
CASES ANNOTATED UNDER OTHER SECTIONS
tSCANLON V. FOOD CRAFTS, INC.
2 Conn. Cir. 3, 193 A.2d 610 (1963)
See the Annotation to Section 2-315, supra.
* Code construed but did not govern the case.
t Based on 1962 Code.
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